

Doubly Victims: Granado and Delgado

Notes on the cross-examination of Jacinto Guerrero Lucas, in Madrid, on CNT premises, on 17 October 2009 in relation to the 1963 Valle de los Caídos and DGS bomb attacks and their aftermath, the arrest and execution of Joaquin Delgado and Francisco Granado

By Antonio Martin Bellido - Paris, 28 March 2010

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Granado y Delgado. Un crimen legal - Guerrero Lucas interrogado **Introduction**



The first time that Francisco Granado and Joaquin Delgado fell victim to Franco and his hired killers was in 1963 and the second occasion was in 1995 as a result of the personal hatreds of their own comrades.

When I was handed Jacinto Guerrero's phone number (in 2009) I had no hesitation in contacting him, although some libertarian comrades, of varying persuasions, tried to talk me out of it on grounds about which I shall say nothing as a matter of "anarchist charity" (pardon the expression).

I was astonished that Guerrero refused to take part in the 17 October 2009 meeting if Alberola took part. It might have been a good chance for them both to settle their differences, face to face and in the presence of the Madrid

comrades arrested in connection with activities in which they themselves had had no hand but which had, in one way or another, been organised by Alberola and Guerrero.

Likewise, having tracked down Arino after the Madrid meeting, he failed to call me by phone to discuss the matters in which he was directly involved.

Guerrero's personal trajectory has indeed been so singular as to lend itself to the extrapolation from his current stance to his role in the years 1960-1963.

It was reasonable therefore, Alberola and Ario being absent, for the questions to be put essentially to Guerrero and for barely a word to have been spoken about the Delgado-Granado affair proper.

I have never thought, as a number of other comrades directly involved in these matters have, that Guerrero was "a paid informant" throughout those years. There are other claimants to that title, notably Inocencio Martinez. Had I thought that Guerrero was the informer in these matters, then plainly I would never have suggested the get-together, knowing that things might have gone very sour.

Mistakes can be made, out of incompetence, due to deficient communications or carelessness or for some other reason, but when we come to two comrades murdered by the Francoists and dozens of others thrown into jail, the failure to own up to one's responsibilities speaks of a moral cowardice and pussyfooting around amounts to trampling over the corpses of our dead comrades.

What Guerrero did or did not do from 1964 up to the present is not my primary concern, and I was not intending to deal with it at the meeting, my reckoning being that it was for those directly concerned to get in touch with him themselves if they were looking for explanations.

2. Organisation of the meeting

Being accustomed, ever since my youth, to attending and organising general meetings, trade union as well as professional. I was aware of the tricks and stratagems employed by those determined to succeed at all costs and in every circumstance and those who bear heavy responsibility but wish to wriggle out of them. On which basis I was afraid, from the start, that finding out exactly what happened was 'mission impossible'.

However, even though the outcome of that meeting was in part a disappointment to me, it did allow me to confirm a number of my interpretations of the facts and, thanks to the contributions from the Madrid comrades who had been imprisoned, I learnt many things I had not known. On that basis alone I believed that there was a point to a meeting such as the one held. When I put it to Guerrero that a face-to-face meeting be organised at the Law Faculty of Toulouse Le Mirail university, he declined to attend because he found Alberola's presence unacceptable. After consulting all of the Madrid comrades arrested in 1962, we changed the location and suggested that we meet on the premises of the Madrid CNT.

Guerrero agreed to that and I told him, on my honour and dignity, that the face-to-face would proceed in accordance with the rules, with no violent altercations or abuse. I am grateful to him for placing his trust in me. He also agreed that I should organise it, however I chose and as I saw fit. I am grateful also to the comrades from the Madrid CNT for having lent us their premises.

3. Initial intentions

In my initial proposal I had suggested - and had been reiterating right from the outset and in my first statement - that we should be grappling primarily with the three issues that I saw, and still see, as crucial: point one being to get the comrades arrested in the wake of the Valle de los Caídos attack to tell us about what relations they had with Jacinto Guerrero and with the exiled FIJJ prior to the incident itself; in point two, we would try to understand how and why Granado and Delgado came to be arrested following the attacks on the DGS (Security HQ) and the Vertical (Falangist) Syndicates in Madrid; and in point three, which is more pertinent today, we would grapple with the serious contradictions noted in the version of events offered by Alberola and Ario in the documentary *Delgado-Granado: un crime lgal* (screened in France in 1996 and in Spain in 1997) as borne out by Carlos Fonseca's books and documents held in the National Archives, and Jacinto Guerrero Lucas's version.

I have never been one for conspiracy theories nor for scapegoating and, having read or viewed nearly all of the books, documentaries and official records dealing with the events in hand and noted the contributions by the leading protagonists: Alberola, Ario, Edo, Guerrero, Mart and indeed Granado and Delgado themselves, I have refused to place any credence at all in anything said or written about Alberola or Guerrero by the far-right and rightwing press or by the police officers, military and magistrates who served under Francoism, believing them to be accessories of that dictatorship, whatever their remarks, interpretations and responsibilities for the arrests. As to reporters, some can be heeded and some ignored. They come in two varieties: some like Carlos Fonseca who, in his book *Garrot pour deux innocents - le cas Delgado-Granado* (1998) confined himself to reporting, as a journalist, what he had been told by the protagonists, police officers and functionaries, as did Eliseo Bayo in his book *GAL: point final* (1997) in which he wrote as another journalist as well as, apparently, a friend and admirer of Guerrero. As to many of the rest, all they have to offer is commentary upon commentary, interpretation upon interpretation — many of them mistaken, incomplete and, on occasion, phoney and manipulative. The majority of these texts point an accusing finger at Guerrero and make him a scapegoat for everything that happened.

4. What was known prior to the screening of the documentary *Le cas Granado-Delgado: un crime lgal?*

In 1975 Octavio Alberola published his book *L'anarchisme espagnol et l'action rvolutionnaire* and in 1979 Jacinto Guerrero Lucas brought out *De ceci et cela*. Whereas the authors in their books both dealt with the Granado-Delgado and Valle de los Caídos affairs, they actually have little to say about what happened and, in particular, about who the main protagonists were. No personal hatred between Guerrero and Alberola is evident in these books.

In the Guerrero book my attention was grabbed by:

- a handwritten letter and envelope addressed to *Hidalgo* (Guerrero's pseudonym) in which the author refers to Franco's leaving Madrid on 25 July.
- an excerpt from an incomprehensible text, a typewritten text, accompanied, at the foot of the page, by a text from Guerrero stating that this was one of "several reports forwarded by the commandos .. *With an eye to the elimination of the dictator.*"
- a photocopy of the front cover of Alvarez Del Vayo's *Un monde en mouvement*, on his return from China in 1970, with a dedication to Guerrero and the inscription "For Guerrero Lucas with the utmost regard for his fighting spirit and belief in the Spanish people's victory." The letter, the envelope and extract from the report came as no surprise to me, knowing as I did that Guerrero had, one way or another, been involved in DI operations. I was more startled by the dedication by Alvarez Del Vayo dated 1970 in his pamphlet *Un monde en mouvement*, knowing (if I may simplify) the great social and political differences, not to mention hatreds, between Marxist-Leninists, Stalinists and anarchists and comparing it with the photocopy of a poster that cropped in the great avenues of Marseilles on 11 May 1969, which is to say, one year earlier, advertising a meeting organised by the Marseilles Local CNT Union, at which Guerrero had spoken on behalf of the CNT of Spain in exile, or with the photocopy of a photo of the platform party at a significant rally in solidarity with the Spanish people,

held in Bordeaux on 17 June 1969, in which Federica Montseny, Liarte and Guerrero can be seen. I found it contradictory that a CNT member should have asked Alvarez Del Vayo to dedicate his pamphlet to him.

5. Points of comparison between the Valle de los Caidos and Granado-Delgado affairs.

Personal experience and my initial reading had led me to believe, up until the documentary *Granado-Delgado: un crime legal* was screened in 1996, that there were many points of comparison between what happened in both instances. In the Valle de los Caidos case, the point was to draw police attention towards the perpetrators of that attack while preparations were undertaken for the attempt on Franco's life in Ayete, and in the DGS case, the object was also to distract police attention which preparations were made for the attempt on Franco's life at the Puente de los Franceses in Madrid.

I had been of the belief that the arrests of Granado and Delgado had resulted from a tip-off from the customer information desk at the Estacin del Norte.

There was a lingering suspicion as to whether the names of Granado and Delgado were known to the police. And the likelihood that the police, remembering what had happened at the Valle de los Caidos and in Ayete, had twigged that in the wake of the DGS attack a plot was being hatched against Franco's life. And so, on Tuesday 30 July the DGS bosses decided to let their dogs off the leash in airports, at border crossing points, in hotels and guesthouses and, suspecting that the activists had come from outside the country, they ordered their agents to examine the papers of all young Spaniards going to or coming from France.

Another similarity was the dispatching of **Paquita** and **Ario** to Madrid, two greenhorns who were not active libertarian militants, although both, for family reasons, were close to CNT and libertarian circles. The sending of those two comrades, like the sending of Delgado, was probably explicable in terms of the dearth of effective means of communication, as well as the fact that the decision had been made not to involve comrades from the Interior in direct action operations, obliging those in charge to use messengers from France.

The arrests of the Madrid comrades came as no surprise to me either, bearing in mind how the police had not managed to arrest those really behind the Valle de los Caidos attack and, in order to make an impression on the Spanish people, they took their revenge on them [those arrested]. The classic ploy of all dictatorships.

In the Valle de los Caidos case, on the other hand, I was startled at **Paquita's** arrest. Who had dispatched Paquita to Madrid and to what purpose when it was known from the press that Madrid comrades had been rounded up?

6. Alberola, Guerrero and the rest

Even though I held positions of responsibility in the Paris Local Federation I cannot recall ever having seen Alberola and Guerrero on the premises in the Rue Sainte Marthe or the Rue Saint Denis. On the few occasions I saw them, it was by chance in some comrade's home, in a car or in a bar, all relating to involvement in some sort of militant activity in Spain or abroad. Up to 1964 the number of times I saw them in private could be counted on the fingers of one hand. I saw Fermin Ramirez in Guerrero's company a few times, but never on our premises. I saw Fermin occasionally at some party or dinner at the home of a girlfriend who was neither a libertarian, nor an activist and who knew no Spanish.

As to "Martin", I am assuming that this was Felipe Martin Armendariz, since the word was that he had been a paratrooper and a friend of Guerrero's, though I never saw them together. Since we were organising parties as a means of raising funds for CNT activities in France and in Spain, held in some town hall or in the basement of some Latin Quarter bar (after the closing down of the Salle Susset), I saw Martin several times but we never spoke of the FIJL or CNT. Martin was only there for the fun and dancing. At any rate that was the impression he gave me.

After the Madrid comrades and Jordi Conill were rounded up, my comrade Rubio and I reckoned — and this might come as a surprise — that we might be safer in Spain than in France. Why? Because in France we never felt safe as long as we were mixed up in dangerous activities in Spain and abroad, in propaganda and solidarity campaigns. This and the fact that lots of people passed through our locals, for reasons unrelated to the CNT and trade unionism.

They were probably infiltrated by agents and police informers. Not to mention oddballs urging far-fetched proposals on us, even though they did not know us, schemes for, say, setting up receivers capable of eavesdropping on conversations of senior officials at the Spanish Embassy in Paris.

Which is why, along with Rubio, after January 1963 we made preparations to return to Spain and gradually dropped out of sight. By the beginning of June we had left our jobs and our homes and had brought Alberola up to speed with our plans. At the start of July we left for Barcelona, looking for work and then we moved on to Madrid, Rubio to renew his passport at a friendly agency and myself in order to register for a DNI number. So it is odd that, apart from my passport, the police never asked me for any papers explaining my presence in Spain.

7. Screening of the documentary *Delgado-Granado: un crime legal*

The screening of the documentary left us dumbfounded and tremendously uneasy. How could we explain away the contradictions between the version of events described by Alberola, Ario, Marti and Edo, consistent with what Granado and Delgado had told the police under questioning and recorded in the official archives, and Guerrero's initial version when he insisted that "he was not involved in anything" and that "he was no longer running any groups", whenever the documentary-maker asked if he could confirm what Alberola and Ario had said. Why did Guerrero never tell us that as Ario had been unable to track down Granado, the scheduled operation was abandoned? If he had, there wouldn't have been any "Guerrero problem" as far as the Granado-Delgado affair was concerned. To me this remains a mystery and I put it down to the hatred that Guerrero feels for Octavio Alberola.

8. Worsening contradictions

Listening attentively to the taping of the meeting or reading an exhaustive transcript of it, it is easy to see that they are a marvellous reflection of pre-planned strategies. One of them has the audience's head spinning with a flood of words, based on the fact that when we hear those words we reckon that they have to have some meaning to them. Another ploy consists of not replying to a question or argument directly and unequivocally, but answering with another question or some roundabout answer or retating behind matters that had nothing to do with the subject in hand.

Things grew more complicated and the differing version ever more contradictory after I read Guerrero's book *Et vous ne dites rien!* (editorial Grafema 2005), and his statements and those of his Madrid comrades at the 17 October meeting. When asked: "Why have you changed your story from what to said in the documentary and in your book *Et vous ne dites rien?*", Guerrero's response was that he was not in a position to answer to an unknown documentary-maker and that the documentary-maker should have put his question directly to Ario in person rather than to him, arguing that Ario could contradict him. Now this is precisely what the documentary-maker did do. As a result the documentary-maker's question was informed by what Ario had already told him. And in order to avert pointless controversy, I refused to pick up on when Guerrero stated "being reluctant to get into lists".

How can one raise an issue without making it visible? I do not think it was foolish of me to visualise the contradictions with the aid of a spreadsheet document setting out those contradictions and the protagonists in the matters about which we were getting together, so as to avert sliding into pointless palaver. Besides, the explanation offered by Guerrero for his initial version of events proved hard to understand. Actually, nobody forced him to appear in the documentary. Everybody who did (and I was one) had to sign a document in which we accorded the documentary-makers the right to film us and include our contributions in the documentary. So why didn't Guerrero just refuse to sign up? Why did he not ask the documentary-maker to set up a filmed interview in Ario's presence so as to set out his version of events, a version he only gave us in 2005 in his book *Et vous ne dites rien*, that is, about ten years later?

In the wake of the issue of the documentary-maker and what Alberola and Ario had said, failure to offer his version of events meant calling into question his honour in the eyes of viewers and his comrades, especially when the issue was nothing more nor less than Francoism's murder of his fellow-freemason Joaquin Delgado.

As agreed, I will pass no comment on Guerrero's trajectory since 1963, but I am stunned that he should have stated that the criticisms levelled by many at his personal career trajectory, and his political and police connections, had not cost him any sleep.

For Guerrero to sleep like a baby despite the criticisms of his post-1963 activities is a matter of no importance. What does and should matter to him too is the opinion among his former comrades of his post-1964 activities. Quite simply, what Guerrero is doing is gambling with his honour and, down through the ages, in every country and every culture, a man's honour has been his most prized earthly possession, so much so that only life itself can stand comparison and be weighed against it. Can Guerrero be indifferent to the charges

levelled (however indirectly) at his own seemingly irresponsible behaviour in relation to the murder of Delgado, his brother-mason?

9. The groups “run” by Guerrero

The comrades arrested in connection with the Valle de los Caídos affair claim that they never belonged to any group and were simply lads, friends who used to gather in bars for a few beers, talk politics and criticise Francoism. From time to time they would distribute a leaflet in some working class district and had no contact with the FIJL in exile nor with the CNT in exile.

As to the group of paratroopers who attended the meeting, they have complained that at no time were they ever standing by to hijack a commercial aircraft as Guerrero may have stated and, furthermore, they accuse him of passing himself off as a “group controller” in order to impress the comrades in exile and of having invented non-existent groups and having talked loosely of possible direct action operations. Others accuse him of having made contact with “well-known anarchists” in Toulouse without telling them and thereby placing them in danger. So much for keeping sensational activities such as the placing of token explosive devices at official sites separate and avoiding contacts between activists abroad and trade union sympathisers within Spain.

The Francoists did their usual thing by rounding up, torturing and murdering folk who had had nothing to do with the matters of which they were accused. We can only hope that when they die the grave-diggers take care to remove their brains before burial, because if they do not, they may poison the graveyard worms. Such people are poisonous right to the grave.

Everyone who attended stated that all friends and comrades acquainted with Guerrero were arrested, but that comrades who had had no contact with him were neither prosecuted nor imprisoned. And we may take it for granted that the suitcase stolen in Toulouse held compromising addresses, documents and names.

We may assume that Guerrero had — and has — some sort of an archivist’s calling, since that suitcase contained a number of documents; and, at the meeting, he stated that he was in a position to present to all who might like it, on a day by day, year by year basis, every single one of the leaflets and posters imaginable that he had helped draft or related to meetings at which he had spoken. Or maybe when Guerrero stated in the documentary that he “was no longer running groups!” he spoke the truth, not just because these “hypothetical groups” had been arrested in August 1962 but also because he never ran any “groups”, as his former comrades contend.

That it proved necessary for him to be asked several times if it was he who sent Paquita to Madrid left us dumbfounded. After stating that he could not remember, at the insistence of those present and in particular of his Madrid ex-comrades who demonstrated how the address of Rafael Ajenjo Barranco was known only to him, Guerrero balked at doing so and let it be understood that it was indeed he who had sent her.

Why did he send her? What secret message did he give her? Another mystery. That message might have damaged the comrades arrested and the police, if they did not know its contents already, might have found out from it that the comrades arrested were in touch with the FIJL, i.e. with an activist organisation likely to have planted the bomb at the Valle de los Caídos and of having attempted on Franco’s life in Ayete. Responsibilities that cannot be shied away easily from without turning renegade.

10. Contradictions between the different version of events

If we are to get a handle on the different versions, a schedule of actions is required:

10.1 The Alberola-Arino version

1. Mid-May: Granado arrived in Madrid by car from Provence.
2. 20 July: Arino was due to leave Paris in the company of his partner Marie-Therese Durand, but there was no train to be had.
3. 21 July: Arino arrived in Madrid and at 11.00 a.m. made his way alone to the scheduled meeting with Granado at the Prado museum at the Goya statue at the entrance and they missed each other.
22-23 July: Again they missed each other. This was confirmed by Granado under questioning by the police.
4. A photocopy of Arino’s diary entry as published by Guerrero in *De ceci et de cela*. According to “official sources” Franco was en route to Burgos on 25 July. The diary page dates from 26 July (See Appendix One). In the same book, Guerrero publishes the envelope from the letter enclosed with the diary: date unknown (deliberately obliterated)

5. 27 July: Delgado reached Madrid and went straight to Arino in his guesthouse.
6. 28 July: Arino set off for Paris via the Estacion del Norte. Delgado escorted him. Delgado stayed behind in Madrid in order to see Granado. On arrival in Paris, Arino sent a report to Guerrero.
7. 29 July: That morning Delgado went to the hardware store before going to see Granado at his guesthouse.
8. 29 July: Bombs went off at the DGS and Vertical Syndicates HQ.
9. 31 July: Delgado and Granado were arrested.

10.2. The Jacinto Guerrero Lucas version

1. One day as I was walking down a street in Toulouse I bumped into Octavio Alberola who stated that he was looking for me. He told me that he had an awful problem. That he had dispatched two people into the Interior.
2. The issue now was rescuing people. I've lost them, said Alberola and I don't know what to do. So I told him I'd go and have a word .. And send somebody into the Interior; a rendezvous was arranged for the Velazquez statue at the Prado museum every day at five o'clock in the afternoon and nobody showed.
3. They hadn't gone because they were already under arrest.
4. It is not very well understood that in 2005, which is to say, about eight years after the screening of the documentary and Fonseca's book, Guerrero offered a more believable version in that it was not based on established facts and dates.

There is every reason to believe that Guerrero never really showed any interest in an affair that cost a brother mason, Joaquin Delgado, his life. Had he actually taken an interest he would have read the official documentation which utterly refutes his own version of events.

First

No comrade was lost: Mart knew Granado's address and Alberola was in touch with Florico.

Second

Had the two comrades been lost, Guerrero could not have dispatched somebody (Arino, I suppose) to wait at the Velazquez statue every day at five o'clock in the afternoon to establish contact with the lost comrades, for the very simple reason that if they were lost, no one could have made contact with them to tell them that a rendezvous at the Velazquez statue at that time had been set up.

Third

As to the comrades — and I take these to be Delgado and Granado — never having turned up at the rendezvous point because they had been arrested, this is an insult to the intelligence. The hours and exact dates of the presence of the aforementioned comrades in Madrid and the locations they visited and where they were arrested are known and not only from what the comrades (Granado and Delgado included) stated but also from the police and the magistrates.

Not to mention the jalopy that Delgado and Granado were driving, when we know that it had broken down and was in the garage for repairs and that Delgado arrived in Madrid on 27 July and only set eyes on it on Monday 29 July.

10.3 My own interpretation of the facts

Summing up, let me say that dispatching Arino to link up with Granado, collect the suitcase of explosives and deliver to "some hypothetical group" run by Guerrero bears a curious resemblance to "the hypothetical groups" of which the jailed Madrid comrades have spoken and we are amazed that, judging by his diary, Arino bothered with Franco's travel plans, when he had gone down to Madrid to rescue some lost comrades from the quagmire into which Alberola had sent them.

My own interpretation is that there was no group. Had there been one, how come it was not a member of that group that showed up to collect the suitcase instead of Arino and his partner's being sent down to do it?

As far as I am concerned, Jacinto Guerrero Lucas's version does not hold water and has a lot to do with his hatred towards Alberola, and this is unacceptable.

The memory of our comrades murdered and imprisoned by Francoism takes precedence over inter-personal hatreds. It is a straightforward matter of honour and dignity.

Provisional conclusion

Since later is better than never when it comes to something that should better have been done at the appropriate time, and so that we may emerge with our heads held high from all the shameful contradictions set out in the documentaries and books released since 1995, I am suggesting a solution, to wit, that Alberola, Arino and Guerrero meet face to face in a meeting organised and hosted by suitable personalities with sufficient moral authority to be acceptable to all three. Any who might not turn up for that cross-examination on unjustified grounds (personal hatred and resentments included) could, at best, be dismissed as irresponsible and, at worst, as cowards and traitors.

Antonio Martin Bellido

Abbreviations

RC 17 Oct.09 - Meeting held on 17 October 2009

Docu: the documentary *Granado-Delgado: un crime lgal*

Bibliography

Jacinto Guerrero *De esto y de aquello*

Jacinto Guerrero *Y ustedes no dicen nada*

Carlos Fonseca *Garrot vil pour deux innocents*